21 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations and External Analytical Support, NFAC

SUBJECT : DCI Discussion/Dinner on Strategic Warning Wednesday, 8 March 1978

1. You are invited to participate in the third of the DCI Dinners, which will be held in the DCI Conference Room on Wednesday, 8 March 1978. Our subject will be: Strategic Warning, which we interpret broadly to mean not only warning of attack on the United States or an ally but also of any critical action involving United States security and other vital interests. The Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in October 1973 is a prime example. Our outside guest and expert will be Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton, who has studied and written on this subject for many years. His paper, "Strategic Intelligence: Problems and Remedies," which is attached, is useful background reading. A brief of "highlights" from the paper is also attached. It provides quotations touching on most of the major points in the paper but is no substitute for a complete reading. The third paper attached is "Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations" by Thomas G. Belden. It is included because Knorr refers to it in his paper

25X1

2. The following is the plan for the evening:

5:30 - 6:00 Company assembles in the DCI Conference Room. Tea, sherry and tomato juice will be served.

6:00 - 7:00 First discussion session. Professor Knorr will pose a limited number of critical questions to be addressed in about ten minutes after which the discussion will become general.

7:00 - 7:30 Dinner.

7:30 - 9:15 Second general discussion session.

25X1

SUBJECT: DCI Discussion/Dinner on Strategic Warning
Wednesday, 8 March 1978

3. If you are unable to participate please call extension [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Attachments:
As stated

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Distribution:
1 - DCI
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DCI Discussion/Dinner on Strategic Warning
8 March 1978, 1730 hours
DCI Conference Room

CIA

Admiral Turner
Robert R. Bowie, D/NFAC
25X1 [redacted] D/DCI/CT
25X1 Vincent Heyman, Director, Operations Center
[redacted], Consultant
Howard Stoertz, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
25X1 [redacted] National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces
[redacted], Chief, Collection Liaison Staff, NFAC
[redacted] Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC
Sidney Graybeal, Director of Strategic Research

Others

Professor Klaus Knorr, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University
Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
25X1 [redacted] Vice Director for Production, DIA
25X1 [redacted] IC Staff



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Minimizing the Risk of Strategic Surprise

Some Questions for Discussion

(1) With reference to estimates of potentially great strategic consequence, should we not insist that the underlying assumptions are spelled out? Would doing so not make it more likely that these analytical assumptions are challenged in the light of new and conflicting information? Should we not also insist that alternative sets of assumptions be explicitly employed, including non-routine worst-case assumptions?

(2) In order to avoid being swamped by the superabundance of information generated by new technologies in a fast-moving crisis, should we not attempt to discover procedures that permit crucial bits of information to be shot to the top by means of bypassing routine mass processing? Can we learn to specify such bits or must we rely on training people at lower echelons to pick them out?

(3) Should we not research all the conditions that give a foreign actor strong incentives to attempt surprise?

(4) And should we not undertake systematic researches into the factors that give a foreign actor a significant capacity for springing surprise?

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

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Reprint from:

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

"Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations"

by Thomas G. Belden

SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD

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Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations

THOMAS G. BELDEN
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C.

Since the warning process goes beyond the sphere of intelligence to impact on decision-making and action, warning and crisis operations have broader objectives than is often thought. The warning process–whose primary elements are indicators, analysis, decision, and action–is conceptualized in interaction terms and further specified using the notion of actor's decision stairways. An objective of any intelligence and warning system is to determine the opponent's position on the decision stairway toward action. Pearl Harbor and the Yom Kippur War illustrate the interaction of participant's decision stairways. Innovations in communications and conferencing techniques, designed to mitigate organizational problems in warning and crisis operations, are described. Suggestions are offered for improved use of probability statements by analysts.

The primary objective of state-conducted intelligence is to acquire information which contributes to warning. However, the warning process goes beyond the sphere of intelligence to impact on the area of decisions and actions. Consequently, warning and crisis operations have a broader series of objectives than often is thought to be the case. These are:

(1) Avoid or head-off a potential crisis situation (crisis avoidance).

(2) If (1) fails, manage the crisis so as to satisfy national policy objectives without resorting to military force.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The ideas contained in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Intelligence Community Staff or any other official agency of the U.S. Government.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 21 No. 1, March 1977

(3) If (2) fails, use conventional military force and diplomatic efforts to avoid long or severe conflict, conventional or nuclear.

(4) If (3) fails, end the conflict on terms as favorable to our interests as possible before Armageddon.

Although the above steps appear to be obvious, it is not clear that our national "nervous system" is designed for the interactions which must take place among our bureaucracies in order to operate effectively in crisis warning situations.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the primary foreign intelligence advisor to the President, is deeply involved in the organizational issues raised in warning and crisis operations. One of the principal functions of the Intelligence Community Staff (of which the author is a member) is to assist the DCI. Over the past three years, we have designed and developed certain communication facilities, techniques, and procedures, some of which are operational while others are still in the developmental stage. Many of these are discussed in this article, including the development and use of "decision stairways," "Meet-Me-Bridge" teleconferencing systems, and probabilistic statements regarding the likelihood of potential crisis. The communication procedures discussed below were developed in response to the tremendous informational burden placed upon the crisis forecaster and manager and the lack of organizational progress which has been made in the area.[1]

The Warning Process

The warning process" is one of the most misunderstood concepts in national policy analysis. The terms "indicators," "intentions," "capabilities," and "estimates" are also used in a wide variety of ways. The problem is continually exacerbated since the term *warning* itself is tied to many other vague words (e.g., strategic warning, tactical warning, political warning, military warning, warning indicators, warning time, long-term warning, and short-term warning).

Warning has one characteristic that separates it from estimates or forecasts: it implies decisions to take actions. For example, to residents of Washington, D.C., a radio bulletin that tornadoes are going to strike Topeka within the next four hours is an estimate or forecast. However, to residents of Topeka, this same information is a warning because it implies that they should make decisions to take protective action.

The warning process is described in Figure 1. On the left is a matrix of indicators (long-term down to short-term and military versus nonmilitary). The indicators are generated by the opponent's activity. The convergence and summation of the indicators leads to an ANALYSIS that, in turn, leads to a DECISION to take an ACTION. The ACTION generates indicators to the opponent, who goes through the same type of process: ANALYSIS–DECISION–ACTION. (See bottom of Figure 1.) His ACTION in turn becomes an indicator to us, completing the first cycle. The cycles are repeated in a process of action and response. Some of the cycles take years to complete; others, only hours or minutes. As events draw close to the hour of action, the action-reaction cycle becomes extremely complex and often unclear. Even in hindsight, the cause-and-effect relationship of particular responses to particular actions often becomes indecipherable.[2]

In the middle of the figure, ANALYSIS is evaluated on a vertical scale, ranging from equivocal to unequivocal. ACTION is also on a vertical scale, running from non or minor action to drastic. Although sometimes



Figure 1: The Warning Process

1. For a different and more detailed perspective on communication and conflict decision-making, see Haas (1974: 98-122).

2. Although there are superficial similarities between this model of the warning process and the mediated stimulus-response model of the Stanford group, there are several important differences, e.g., the latter put much more emphasis on perception than does the former. See, for example, Holsti et al. (1969).

necessary, it is risky to take drastic action on the basis of highly equivocal indicators. However, it is possible to take less than drastic action, such as going on alert, on the basis of equivocal indicators, e.g., a 40% chance that a drastic event will occur. This topic will be discussed in more depth below.

Depending on one's objectives, there are many possible strategies for interaction. On the one hand, the opponent's decision can be made more difficult by increasing the ambiguity, or equivocality, of indicators sent to him. On the other hand, if one wants to prevent the opponent from taking drastic action, it might be desirable to communicate intent as clearly as possible.[3]

Unfortunately, our government is not organized to meet the demands of the warning process. There are some major bureaucratic barriers not shown in Figure 1, particularly between the ANALYSIS and DECISION functions (the intelligence community and the policy and decision makers) and between the ANALYSIS (intelligence) and ACTION operation, or J-3 (Operations Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) functions.[4] Some efforts to overcome these barriers with improved interagency communication techniques are discussed below.

The Interactions between Opposing Decision-Makers

The cycles of the warning process in Figure 1 are obviously generated by the actions emanating from opposing decision-makers. What we do affects what the opponent does, and what he does affects what we do.[5] This phenomenon of interaction has profound implications upon the concept known as *intentions.*

Whenever a nation is contemplating a major political-military action, it must go through the series of decision steps suggested in Figure 2. First, the national decision-maker must be aware of his own capabilities (and limitations), of what he can (and cannot) do. Once he feels threatened by another nation, he must determine his policy options (what he might do if . . .). He must then examine contingency options and plans and, if the threat continues, move up the decision stairway with operational plans, orders, commands, and finally the command of execution. As illustrated by the recent attempt of the South Vietnamese government to disengage its troops in the north by precipitous action without proper planning, any decision-maker who avoids or skips these steps does so at his peril.



Figure 2: Decision Stairway

As one ascends this stairway, the probability of war increases. At any time, however, decision-maker B might take an action which alters the situation in such a way to cause decision-maker A to change his mind, "back off," and go down the stairway away from hostilities.

Consider the case of the events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor as expressed in terms of the decision stairway in Figure 3. After a build-up of capabilities in the late 1930s, the Japanese attained the capability to dominate the Western Pacific. However, they also were engaged in a war with China, which generated hostile reactions from the United States (in the form of economic sanctions). The Japanese responded with contingency options and plans which, after our imposition of an oil embargo on Japan, led to the operational plans to attack Pearl Harbor. But negotiations with the United States were continuing even as Admiral Nagumo, the Japanese task force commander, was moving his fleet across the North Pacific toward Hawaii. He was sailing under contingency orders

3. For further discussion of these points, see, as a small sample, Jervis (1970), Snyder (1972), Milburn (1972), McClelland (1964), and the many excellent discussions of the Cuban missile crisis, e.g., Allison (1971).

4. For more on these barriers, see Boulding (1970: 85), Hilsman (1956), Barnds (1969), Ransom (1974), and Kent (1965).

5. Since this is not the place for a theoretical or methodological discussion of levels of analysis and their linkages, this rather cavalier connection will be allowed to stand. Crisis and warning can be examined from both perspectives, as illustrated by McClelland (1969, 1972a, 1972b) and Hermann (1969).



Figure 3: Japanese Decision Process Leading to Pearl Harbor

to attack the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor if two conditions were satisfied: (1) the U.S. Fleet was in Pearl Harbor, and (2) he could achieve surprise. Nagumo was under the additional orders that if he were detected by the U.S. Navy down to 24 hours prior to the attack, he was to say that his task force was only on an exercise, and he was to bring it back to Japan.

If the U.S. intelligence system had been able to detect the approach of Nagumo's task force, and if our policy-makers had decided to let the Japanese know we knew they were approaching Pearl Harbor, then Nagumo would have been deterred from attacking. Given these circumstances, what could one have said about the *intention* of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor? The concept of intentions is not simple.[6] Certainly the Japanese delayed the intention to attack as late as was feasible, using the standard decision technique of keeping one's options open as long as possible.[7]

The important point is that *the best any intelligence system can do is to determine where the opponent is on the decision stairway.* In many

6. The old debate over whether an opponent should be evaluated in terms of his capabilities or intentions continues. For views on the problem, see Brodie (1959: 378-379), Armbruster (1969: 223), Donnelly (1963: 6-9), Shlaim (1976: 362-365), and McClelland (1972b: 33-34).

7. Wohlstetter (1962), of course, provides an excellent analysis on the Pearl Harbor attack. See also Shlaim (1976: 378).



Figure 4: B's Response to A

circumstances, this determination can be used to take actions which will force the opponent to avoid conflict.

It should be remembered that one cannot make predictions of future events with absolute certainty, because the opposing decision-maker might not yet have made up his own mind whether or not to execute his plan. That decision might well depend on one's own actions.

Confusion also arises from the false dichotomy of whether the opponent is conducting an "exercise" or "a real operation." In the Pearl Harbor case, if the Japanese had been detected, the "real operation" would indeed have been an "exercise."

It is also possible for A to take an action which changes B's plans away from hostilities without A's ever knowing it. Conversely, it is possible for A's actions to be misunderstood by B, with subsequent hostilities resulting from miscalculation.

Interactions of Opponent Decisions

Figure 4 depicts the decision stairway of nation A and the decision responses of opponent B. The case in which B is not tracking A's decisions,

with the result being total surprise, is represented by the dashed line going out horizontally and then straight up.[8] The other dashed line indicates a situation in which B not only tracks A's decisions but decides to preempt (e.g., Israel–1967). However, the usual minimum objective is the case where B tracks A's decisions well enough to be in a strong defensive position when A finally attacks.

There is, of course, a lag between A's decision at any given time, and B's own decision to respond. This lag, noted as "perception time," includes the time consumed for detection, analysis, and making the decision.

Figure 5 indicates a case in which B's responses to A's decisions eventually deter A's moves toward hostilities and cause A to "back off" and go down the decision stairway away from hostilities. The Cuban missile crisis is the classic example of this type of interaction. In that case, the decision stairway tracking was done well enough so that U.S. actions (and associated signals) deterred the Soviets. Although the missile crisis was a success from the U.S. point of view, it should be remembered that resorting to this kind of response can be very dangerous because of the potential for miscalculation by either side.

Figure 6 represents a situation in which A and B generate a confrontation between C and D. An example of these "second-order



Figure 5: B's Response Deters A

8. For more on surprise, see Ben-Zvi (1976) and Shlaim (1976: 348-351).



Figure 6: A versus B Triggers C verses D

crises" is the Yom Kippur War in the fall of 1973. In terms of Figure 5, A would represent the Arab nations, B the Israelis, C the United States, and D the Soviet Union. While C (the United States) had an intelligence interest in the developing hostilities between the Arabs (A) and the Israelis (B), there were no drastic decisions to be made by the United States until the period of the confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union.[9] The big power confrontation arose after the war had started, specifically after 16 October, when the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal and eventually cut off the Egyptian Third Army (after apparently breaking two cease-fire agreements). The indicators of potential superpower involvement were generated primarily by the tactical ground situation on the west bank of the Canal between 16 and 26 October. In short, the warning of a confrontation between the major powers derived from a tactical situation arising from a localized conflict.

Organization for Detection of the Decision Stairway

Unfortunately the indicators generated in crisis situations do not come neatly packaged in political, military, economic, strategic, tactical, major power, and minor power categories. They are a mixture of all these

9. For the interactions of U.S. and Israeli intelligence, see Shlaim (1976: 360-361).

elements. It is even difficult to draw a line between the indications and warning phase, and the crisis or hostilities phase.[10] The difficulty of trying to fit the 1973 Middle East crisis, illustrated by Figure 6, into these organizational concepts is shown in Figure 7. The horizontal line roughly indicates the division of the world into "strategic-tactical," a division that can cause problems when the "strategic" decisions at higher levels are generated by tactical events. The division between "I&W" (Indications and Warning) and "crisis ops" (crisis operations)—roughly, the vertical line on Figure 7—fails to cover situations in which one crisis generates another.

As illustrated in the major power confrontation resulting from the Yom Kippur War, the concept of "big W" versus "little w" (the distinction between major powers, e.g., USSR, CPR, and the United States as mutual opponents, and minor powers as opponents) also has obvious shortcomings. When would the "big W" mechanism have been turned on in that



Figure 7: A versus B Triggers C versus D

10. Scholars of international politics have long studied crises and their phases from various perspectives. For diverse examinations and explanations of crisis phases and factors operating within the across these phases, see Lasswell (1965: 62-71), McClelland (1972b: 35; 1972a), Young (1968: 18-19), Wright (1965), Bloomfield and Beattie (1971), Bloomfield and Leiss (1969: 3-39), and Hermann (1969).

case? After 6 October, the date the war began, or before? If before, how much before and through what type of indicators?

Obviously it is necessary to organize the warning talents of the intelligence community in some fashion, but it appears that almost any organizational choice will have defects. A part of the solution lies in recognizing these defects and trying to overcome them by a variety of means.

One phenomenon to be overcome is what might be called "hardening of the categories." If one is too rigid in terms of the information coverage functions of any one organization, there is the risk that some vital information will fall between the organizational cracks. It would be better to err on the side of overlap.

The organizational problem is further complicated by the growing number of intelligence organizations. Figure 8a outlines the growth of the intelligence community between Pearl Harbor and Korea. We started in 1941 with the FBI, the Army's G-2, and the Office of Naval Intelligence—ONI. The stream of acronyms of intelligence organizations at the top of Figure 8b indicates the growth up to 1969, and does not include the changes and additions in the last seven years.[11] This is not a criticism of the various organizations. They all do essential intelligence work. The difficulty lies in bringing together the relevant information necessary to determine the opponent's decision stairway (as well as our own).

Interagency Communications for Warning and Crisis Operations

With improved communication techniques, existing organizations can be used to bring together critical information about warning and crisis operations. One of the basic tools is the use of remote conferencing.



Figure 8a: Intelligence Organizations, 1940–1951

11. While the acronyms may be meaningless to many readers, the point of Figures 8A and 8B is the proliferation of agencies rather than their names.



Figure 6: Intelligence Organizations, 1940–1969

One conferencing system, which has recently become operational, is the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net (NOIWON) which allows the operation centers of CIA, DIA, NSA, State, State INR, J-3, and the White House Situation Room to call a secure voice conference at any time. Such a conference has three possible results. In most cases, the participants simply share information on a given situation which has come to [illegible] attention. However, if any one of the NOIWON members feels it ne[illegible]ry to take a particular action (such as notifying his agency director in the middle of the night or recommending that his organization go on some type of alert), he will notify the other members of the NOIWON. Finally, if any two watch officers decide that the incident is sufficiently important, they may issue an "Advisory" (a short formatted message describing what is known, and what is not known, about the incident). The Advisory is distributed upward, laterally, and downward through each organization. It not only gives information but also seeks feedback information on aspects which are unknown or ambiguous. Other NOIWON members may register dissent, but they are required to transmit the Advisory within their own organization.

A second type of conference can occur among analysts of the same organizations represented in the NOIWON (except the White House) and is known as the NOIAN (National Operations and Intelligence Analysts Net).

The NOIAN, a system now being tested, is chaired by the appropriate National Intelligence Officer (NIO) and uses secure voice in a conferencing mode. This system, called "Meet-Me-Bridge," is established by notifying each conferee to dial a predetermined number at an appointed time to begin the conference. No operator is required.

Another system now being developed which can be used by the NOIAN is CONTEXT (CONferenced TEXT editing), which allows secure voice (speaker phones) to be used in conjunction with a cathode ray tube (CRT) and a hard-copy printer. These devices, placed in a conferencing room at each major facility (CIA, Pentagon, NSA, and the State Department), will allow analysts who are specialists for a given tension or crisis area to create jointly a national situation report, a proposed alerting memorandum, or other documents of severe time sensitivity, without having to leave their own headquarters. The secure voice conference element of CONTEXT uses high-quality speaker phones in each CONTEXT room. The voice lines are connected, so that use of any CONTEXT phone automatically rings the others. The voice portion of CONTEXT can be used independently of the computer-visual data features. When used by itself, the voice element of CONTEXT becomes the equivalent of a "Meet-Me-Bridge."

Although improved communication techniques are not a panacea, they might help solve some of the organizational difficulties surrounding the inseparable functions of indications, warning, and crisis operations. However, the basic problem remains: given all the improvements in physical communication, what do people have to say to each other? How precisely do they say what they mean? One of the most difficult forms of precise expression is making warning statements in probabilistic terms.

Warning and Probability

The decision stairway (see Figures 3 through 7) is expressed in terms of time (horizontal axis) and probability (vertical axis). This requires that warning must also be expressed in these terms. The minimum expression of an interactive warning estimate must be in the form:

There is a _____% probability that A will act upon B by _____(when).

There are many possible variations on this statement. First, probability can be expressed in terms of words, including auxiliary verbs and adverbs (might, might possibly, probably, and the like). Unfortunately, such expressions convey different meanings to different people. The uses of numbers (20%, probability, 3-to-1 odds, 4 chances in 10, and the like) are

not without difficulties as well, particularly when used with false precision (e.g., 23.2%), but they do have the merit of internal consistency. Further, the choice of the number itself is not as important as the *change* over time of the number on a given estimate.

Below are listed some general principles governing probability statements:

(1) *The more precise the prediction, the lower the probability.* If one says, "A will attack B on 16 September," that statement will have a lower probability than, "A will attack B in September."

(2) *The greater the number of information elements within the probability statement, the lower the probability.* For example, "Three of A's divisions at X will attack two of B's divisions at Y on 16 September" will have a lower probability of being correct than "A will attack B on 16 September."

(3) *The overall probability of the statement cannot be greater than the probability of any one element.* Using the first example in (2) above, if there is only a 30% probability that B has two divisions at Y, then the overall probability cannot exceed 30%.

(4) *In general, the greater the time span of prediction, the lower the probability of its occurrence.* This requires that all probability statements include the date the prediction was made.

In making a probability statement, one must always keep in mind what one's own actions might do to the prediction. This holds even if one is not one of the two opposing parties. Some remarks should accompany the probability statement giving the assumptions regarding these potential interactions.

A warning estimate should always carry the name of the estimator and he provision for additional narrative information, sources, and other comments, including dissenting views.

Figure 9 is an example of a format for a warning estimate. Not all of the interrogatives of the information element (1 through 12) need be filled in. However, a minimum of subject (3), verb phrase (6), object (9), and time (11) are essential in an interactive warning estimate.

At any given time, an analyst might write several warning estimates related to the situation. This will allow him to review the estimates periodically and record any changes in the probability and the reason(s) for the change. The changes can be used to "take the temperature" of the situation. To do this, one must use precisely the same form of probability statement in the reassessment over time.

INDICATIONS, WARNINGS AND CRISIS OPERATIONS

Warning Estimate

Information as of:
Time of Release:
Identification No.

FROM:

TO:

THERE IS A 30% PROBABILITY THAT:

1.	HOW MANY:	Three
2.	(OF) WHOSE:	of A's
3.	WHAT/WHO:	divisions
4.	WHERE:	at X
5.	WHEN:	— — —
6.	(VERB PHRASE):	will attack
7.	HOW MANY:	two.
8.	(OF) WHOSE:	of B's
9.	WHAT/WHOM:	divisions
10.	WHERE:	at Y
11.	WHEN:	on 16 September
12.	HOW + CONJUNCTION:	
13.	SOURCE(S):	
14.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:	
15.	COORDINATION COMMENTS:	

Phone No.:

16. PREPARED BY:

(Security Classification)

(Security Classification)

Figure 9: Indications, Warnings and Crisis Operations

The importance for the policy-maker-consumer of accepting probabilistic warning estimates cannot be overemphasized because they relate to the type of decision (from drastic down to none) he is attempting to make. He

hould also remember that if the kind of decision at hand does not require n estimate of great precision, a higher probability might be expressed.)ne possibility is for the consumer and the intelligence analyst responsible or a warning estimate to confer and agree on a series of basic probability tatements and, without changing the wording, to review from time to ime the changes in the probability and the reasons why the changes occurred.

Summary

Warning and crisis operations should be the most vital functions of the ntelligence, diplomatic, and military organizations of our government. As evidenced by our performance in past crises, our national nervous system s not designed for a coherent response in most situations. We do not fully understand the warning process nor do we have complete knowledge of how our nervous system functions. Not only do we fail at human communications within our system, but we fail to perceive the interactions between our decision-makers and our opponents. We fail to express our estimates in probabilistic terms and relate these estimates to the kinds of alternative decisions that can be taken.

None of these shortcomings can be overcome by simple panaceas. However, there are remedial steps which can be taken, particularly in the area of more precise communication across the diverse parts of our government. These remedies cannot be effectively administered by any one segment (diplomatic, intelligence, or military), but they must be done in concert if we are to forecast-warn, avert, and effectively manage crises.

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17 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC

SUBJECT : DCI Discussion/Dinner on Strategic Warning

1. The DCI has set Wednesday, 8 March, as the date for the next discussion/dinner. I want to get the invitations and reading materials out on Tuesday (21 February).

2. Meantime, some problems have developed on the invitee list.

a. I have learned that [redacted] is the CIA rep on the interagency committee on which [redacted] represents the DoD. Sayre Stevens says that [redacted] should be included and offers to be left off the list to make room (Sayre says that as he is having a night with [redacted] on Tuesday he would prefer to be left off the Wednesday list). 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

b. What about Ambassador Carlucci?

3. I recommend the following list:

CIA	Others
Admiral Turner	Professor Knorr
Ambassador Carlucci	Lt. Gen. Tighe
R.R.B.	[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1	[redacted] IC Staff 25X1
Lehman	
Heyman (Vince) 25X1	
[redacted]	
Stoertz	
[redacted] 25X1	

4. The total is 15 as you specified before (and I subsequently persuaded [redacted] 25X1 to accept). I have left [redacted] off the list to make room for the DDCI. Sayre Steven's omission makes a place for [redacted] 25X1 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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NFAC-2895-77/1

16 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations and External Analytical Support, NFAC

SUBJECT : DCI Discussion/Dinner on Strategic Warning

REFERENCE : Memorandum, same subject, 7 November 1977

1. Action Requested: Approval of Thursday, 26 January, as the date for the subject dinner.

2. You will recall that a discussion/dinner on the subject of strategic warning was proposed for mid-December and that you elected to defer it until after the first of the year. I have ascertained that Thursday, 26 January is available on your calendar. May I suggest, then, that the dinner be re-scheduled for that date. Prof. Knorr of Princeton, who is our outside expert on the subject, is not available on Mondays and Tuesdays. But Wednesday and Friday, 25 and 27 January, would also be acceptable should one of them be preferred.

25X1

APPROVED: 26 Jan OK ST 1/18/78

DATE SELECTED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

EH

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

NFAC-684-78

SUBJECT: (Optional) DCI Discussion/Dinner on Strategic Warning Wednesday, 8 March 1978

78-536

FROM: [redacted], Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC

25X1

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 21 February 1978

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. NFAC/CAR			J.K.	SIGNATURES This is the memo that is going out to those invited from CIA and the IC staff to the dinner/discussion on Strategic Warning on Wednesday, 8 March 1978. It is being circulated a week ahead to afford time for reading the attachments. 25X1
2.				
3. DCI	Rec'd 21 Feb 78	9 MAR 1978		
4. NFAC/CAR				[redacted] NFAC/CAR
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

OK ST

Let me send over week end